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1. Introduction 
According to the Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (September 2007), we 
have the following description for supply chain management: 
“supply chain management encompasses the planning and management of all activities involved in 
sourcing and procurement, conversion, and all logistics management activities. Importantly, it also 
includes coordination and collaboration with channel partners, which can be suppliers, 
intermediaries, third-party service providers, and customers. In essence, supply chain management 
integrates supply and demand management within and across companies.” From this description, 
it is obviously true that a supply chain in general has multiple channel members (usually 
called stages) and the coordination and collaboration among these members is a crucial task 
in supply chain management.  
In the literature, various policies for supply chain optimization and channel coordination 
have been proposed. Among them, setting a supply chain contract between individual 
parties has received much attention in recent years (Tsay et al. 1999, Cachon 2003). Contracts 
such as buy-back contract, revenue sharing contract, quantity flexibility contract and rebates 
contract are all known forms of contract which can help to achieve channel coordination in a 
supply chain. However, in the majority of the literature works, the channels' and supply 
chain’s objectives are either maximizing the expected profit or minimizing the expected cost. 
There is no discussion on the level of risk associated with these contracts. As a result, the 
contract parameters under which coordination is achieved may be viewed as unrealistic by 
decision makers. In light of this, we conduct in this paper a mean-variance analysis on some 
popular forms of supply chain contracts such as buy-back contract. By including a constraint 
on profit uncertainty, we illustrate how decision makers can make a scientifically sound and 
tailored decision with respect to their degrees of risk aversion. Managerial implications are 
discussed.  
The organization of the rest of this chapter is as follows: We briefly review some related 
literature in Section 2, the discussion of the supply chain’s structure is presented in Section 
3. The mean-variance analyses on the buy-back contract and wholesale pricing profit 
sharing contract are conducted in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. We conclude with some 
discussions on managerial implications in Section 6. 
For a notational purpose, we use the following notation in many places throughout this 
chapter: P = profit, EP = expected profit, SP = standard deviation of profit, MV = mean-
Source: Supply Chain,Theory and Applications, Book edited by: Vedran Kordic, ISBN 978-3-902613-22-6, pp. 558, February 2008, I-Tech Education and Publishing, Vienna, Austria
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variance. The subscripts “M, R, SC” represent “Manufacturer, Retailer, Supply Chain”, 
respectively. 
2. Literature review 
Pioneered by Nobel laureate Harry Markowitz in the 1950s, the mean-variance formulation 
has become a fundamental theory for risk management in finance (Markowitz 1959). In 
decision sciences, the mean-variance approach and the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
approach (called utility function approach in short) are two well established methodologies 
for studying decision making problems with risk concerns. The utility function approach is 
more precise but its application is limited owing to the difficulty in getting a closed form 
expression of the utility function for every individual decision maker in practice. The mean-
variance approach, as what Van Mieghem (2003) mentioned, aims at providing an 
implementable, useful but approximate solution. It is true that a utility function in general 
cannot be expressed fully in terms of mean and variance only. However, it is shown in Van 
Mieghem (2003) that maximizing a utility function with a constant coefficient of risk 
aversion is equivalent to maximizing a mean-variance performance measure (also see 
Luenberger 1998, Choi et al. 2008 for some supplementary discussions). There are also 
evidences in the literature which demonstrate that the mean-variance approach yields a 
solution which is close to the optimal solution under the utility function approach (see Levy 
& Markowitz 1979, Kroll et al. 1984, and Van Mieghem 2003). Moreover, some meaningful 
and applicable objectives, such as the safety first objective (Roy 1952), can be formulated 
under the mean-variance framework. Despite all kinds of arguments on the mean-variance 
approach, it is adopted as the performance measure in this chapter because it’s “applicable, 
intuitive and implementable”. In addition, more analytical results can be generated under 
this approach. On the other hand, even though the mean-variance and utility function 
approaches are well-established in finance, their applications in supply chain management 
are not yet fully revealed. In fact, most research works on this important topic appear only 
in recent years. We review some of them as follows. 
First, in Lau (1980), instead of maximizing the expected profit, the author derives an optimal 
order quantity which maximizes an objective function of the expected profit and standard 
deviation of profit for the classic newsvendor problem. Next, Eechhoudt et al. (1995) study 
the classic newsvendor problem with risk averse newsvendor via a utility function approach 
and obtain some interesting findings on the optimal stocking quantity.  Later on, Lau and 
Lau (1999) directly extend the work of Pasternack (1985) and study a single-manufacturer 
single-retailer supply chain model under which both the retailer and manufacturer seek to 
maximize a linear objective function of the expected profit and variance of profit. Choi et al. 
(2008) analyze via a mean-variance approach the supply chains under returns policy in both 
decentralized and centralized settings. Implications for setting returns contracts for 
achieving channel coordination with risk considerations are discussed. Some other recent 
research works which analyse the risk issues in supply chain management include a 
qualitative discussion on proactive supply management and its close relationship with risk 
management (Smeltzer & Siferd 1998), a quantitative analysis of the role of intermediaries in 
supply chains to reduce financial risk (Agrawal & Seshadri 2000), a mean-variance analysis 
of single echelon inventory problems (Chen & Federgruen 2000), a study of the risk-free 
perishable item returns policy with a risk neutral retailer in a two-echelon supply chain 
(Webster & Weng 2000), an investigation of the use of capacity options in managing risk 
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from demand uncertainty (Tan 2002), an analysis of the use of commitment-option for 
supply chain contract setting with forecast updates (Buzacott et al. 2003), a study on 
contracting scheme with risk preferences considerations (Bassok & Nagarajan 2004), a mean-
variance analysis for the newsvendor problem with and without the opportunity cost of 
stock out (Choi et al. 2007a), and a study on channel coordination in supply chains under 
mean-variance objectives (Choi et al. 2007b)  
3. Supply chain model 
Consider a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. The retailer 
sells a fashionable product and faces an uncertain market demand. The manufacturer bears 
a unit product cost of c and sells the product to the retailer with a unit wholesale price w. 
For the retailer the unit product’s selling price is r. At the end of the selling season, there is a 
salvage market in which any product leftover can be salvaged at a unit price v. Let the 
market demand faced by the retailer be x with a probability density function f(x), and a 
corresponding cumulative distribution function F(x). We assume that there is a one-to-one 
mapping between F(·) and its argument. We consider the following sequence of action: The 
manufacturer will first announce the wholesale price and other parameters (with respect to 
different kinds of contracts) to the retailer, the retailer will react by placing an order with a 
quantity q. We assume that the manufacturer can always fulfil the required order quantity 
placed by the retailer. For a notational purpose, define:  
2
000
))(()(2)(2)( ∫∫∫ −−= qqq dxxFdxxxFdxxFqqξ  
Table 1 below gives the profit, expected profit, standard deviation of profit of the simple 
supply chain described above. Observe that the manufacturer is risk free and can always 
make a positive profit when the wholesale price is larger than the production cost under this 
simple supply chain. 
 
 Supply Chain Retailer Manufacturer 
P +−−−− ))(()( xqvrqcr  +−−−− ))(()( xqvrqwr  qcw )( −  
EP xdxFvrqcr
q∫−−− 0 )()()(  xdxFvrqwr q∫−−− 0 )()()(  qcw )( −  
SP )()( qvr ξ−  )()( qvr ξ−  0 
Table 1. Profit, Expected Profit, and Standard Deviation of Profit of the Simple Supply Chain 
without Additional Contracts 
We now consider two kinds of contracts, the buy-back contract and the wholesale-pricing 
profit-sharing contract, in the following. 
3.1 Buy-back contract 
Under the buy-back contract, by the end of the selling season, the retailer can return the 
unsold products to the manufacturer for a partial refund with a unit buy-back price b, where 
wbv <≤ . The returned products have a unit value of v to the manufacturer. We can derive 
the profit, expected profit, and standard deviation of profit under the buy-back contract for 
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the supply chain, the retailer, and the manufacturer respectively as shown in Table 2 (see 
Choi et al. 2008 for the details of derivations). 
 
 Supply Chain Retailer Manufacturer 
P +−−−− ))(()( xqvrqcr  +−−−− ))(()( xqbrqwr  +−−−− ))(()( xqvbqcw  
EP xdxFvrqcr
q∫−−− 0 )()()( xdxFbrqwr q∫−−− 0 )()()( xdxFvbqcw q∫−−− 0 )()()(  
SP )()( qvr ξ−  )()( qbr ξ−  )()( qvb ξ−  
Table 2. Profit, Expected Profit, and Standard Deviation of Profit under the Buy-back 
Contract 
Notice that the supply chain’s expected profit and standard deviation of profit are not 
affected by the presence of the buy-back contract. 
3.2 Wholesale pricing and profit sharing contract 
Under the wholesale pricing and profit sharing contract, the manufacturer controls the 
wholesale price w, where w can be set to be c, i.e., the manufacturer is supplying at cost and 
makes zero profit from the direct supply. On the other hand, the manufacturer will share the 
retailer’s profit with a proportion of )1( α− , where 10 << α . To be specific, we can derive 
the following the profit, expected profit and standard deviation of profit under the 
wholesale pricing and profit sharing contract for the supply chain, the retailer, and the 
manufacturer, respectively: 
 
 Supply Chain Retailer Manufacturer 
P +−−−− ))(()( xqvrqcr  ]))(()[( +−−−− xqvrqwrα  +− qcw )( ⋅− )1( α  
]))(()[( +−−−− xqvrqwr  
E
P 
xdxFvrqcr
q∫−−− 0 )()()(
 
])()()[(
0
xdxFvrqwr
q∫−−−α
 
+− qcw )( ⋅− )1( α  
])()()[(
0
xdxFvrqwr
q∫−−−
 
SP )()( qvr ξ−  )()( qvr ξα −  )())(1( qvr ξα −−  
Table 3: Profit, Expected Profit, and Standard Deviation of Profit under the Wholesale 
Pricing and Profit Sharing Contract 
Remarks and findings:  
i. Please notice that under both buy-back contract and the wholesale pricing and profit 
sharing contract, the expected profit functions of both the retailer and supply chain are 
concave in q, and their standard deviation of profit functions are increasing in q (see 
Choi et al. 2007a for more details). 
ii. A direct observation from the expected profit and standard deviation of profit 
expressions for the manufacturer in Tables 1, 2 and 3 indicates that the manufacturer is 
basically risk free under the simple supply chain without additional contracts. 
However, under both the buy-back contract and wholesale pricing and profit sharing 
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contract, the manufacturer needs to bear a higher risk. As a result, depending on the 
degree of risk aversion of the manufacturer, exercising one of these contracts is not 
always beneficial because the risk level for the manufacturer is higher. 
iii. From Tables 1, 2 and 3, we can see that the sum of retailer’s SP and manufacturer’s SP 
equals the supply chain’s SP. The same applies for the expected profit EP. As a result, a 
change of the contract parameter, of either the buy-back contract and the wholesale 
pricing and profit sharing contract, can lead to a reallocation of benefit (expected profit) 
and risk (standard deviation of profit) between the manufacturer and the retailer. 
Bargaining power hence plays a crucial role especially for the wholesale pricing and 
profit sharing contract. 
4. Mean-variance decision models 
We now consider the above proposed supply chain in which the manufacturer acts as a 
supply chain coordinator. Here, instead of maximizing the supply chain’s expected profit,  
the manufacturer adopts the following MV objective for the supply chain: 
)1(P
     
.)(..
)(max
SCSC
SC
q
kqSPts
qEP
≤
 
The objective of (P1) is to maximize the supply chain’s expected profit subject to a constraint 
on the supply chain’s standard deviation of profit, where SCk  is a positive constant. 
Represent by )]/()[(1*, vrcrFq EPSC −−= −  the product quantity which maximizes )(qEPSC . 
The efficient frontier for (P1) can be constructed with ],0[ *,EPSCqq∈ , and ],0[ *,EPSCq  is the 
efficient region. In (P1), a smaller SCk  implies that the  manufacturer (who is the decision 
maker) is more conservative and risk averse. We thus call SCk  the supply chain’s risk aversion 
threshold. Notice that when SCk ∈  [0, )( *,EPSCSC qSP ], a smaller value of SCk  would lead to a 
smaller optimal quantity for (P1) because in this region: )(qEPSC  is increasing and 
concave, )(qSPSC  is increasing, and the constraint SCSC kqSP ≤)(  is active. When 
SCk > )( *,EPSCSC qSP , the SP constraint becomes “inactive” as the optimal solution is always 
*,EPSCq .  Represent the optimal solution of (P1)  by *q . It is easy to show that *q  exists and 
can be uniquely determined (see Choi et al. 2007a for the details). Similar to the model 
setting in (P1), the retailer’s decision making problem is modelled as follows, 
)2(P
     
.)(..
)(max
RR
R
q
kqSPts
qEP
≤
 
In (P2), the retailer tries to maximize his expected profit with the corresponding standard 
deviation of profit under control, i.e., RR kqSP ≤)( , where Rk is a positive constant and it is 
the retailer’s risk aversion threshold.  When the manufacturer has specified the details on the 
wholesale price and other contract parameters, the retailer will determine an order quantity 
*Rq  which optimizes (P2). Observe that there exists a unique  *,MVRq  (see Choi et al. 2007a 
for the details). 
In general, *q  and *,MVRq  are different. In this chapter, we consider the best product quantity 
for the supply chain in the mean-variance domain as *q . As a consequence, the manufacturer 
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who acts as the supply chain coordinator can consider using some incentive alignment 
schemes to try to entice the retailer to order  in a quantity which is equal to *q . We will 
now explore how the buy-back contract and the wholesale pricing and profit sharing 
contract can help to achieve this kind of coordination in a mean-variance domain. We 
separate the analysis into two parts in the next two sections. 
5. Coordination by the buy-back contract in the mean-variance domain 
Under the presence of the buy-back contract, we rewrite (P2) into (P2(b)) as follows, 
))(2( bP
    
,];[..
];[max
RR
R
q
kbqSPts
bqEP
≤
 
where ];[ bqEPR = xdxFbrqwr
q∫−−− 0 )()()( , ];[ bqSPR = )()( qbr ξ−  (see Table 2), and b is the 
buy-back price offered by the manufacturer. Denote the optimal order quantity for (P2(b)) 
by )(*, bq BBR  . Following the approach in Choi et al. (2008), for any given b, we define the 
following: 
 )(*2, bqR = }0)|({arg =− RR
q
kbqSP , (1) 
 )]/()[()( 1*1, brwrFbqR −−= − . (2) 
Notice that )(*1, bqR  is the order quantity which maximizes the retailer’s expected profit with 
a given b. The following procedure, Procedure 1, provides the steps to identify the buy-back 
price which can achieve coordination ( *,MVSCb ): 
Procedure 1 
Step 1. Compute *q  by solving (P1). 
Step 2. Determine  a parameter *1b  which makes )(*1, bqR  = *q  as follows: 
)(*1, bqR  = *q  
⇔ =−−− )]/()[(1 brwrF *q  
⇔ =b *)](/)[( qFwrr −−  
 ∴ *1b *)](/)[( qFwrr −−= .  (3) 
Step 3. Determine a parameter *2b  as follows: 
)(*2, bqR *q=  
⇔ 0)|*( =− RR kbqSP  
22 *)()( Rkqbr =−⇔ ξ  
*)(/ qkrb R ξ−=⇔ or *)(/ qkrb R ξ+= . 
www.intechopen.com
Mean-Variance Analysis of Supply Chain Contracts 
 
91 
Since rb < , *)(/ qkrb R ξ+=  is rejected: 
 *2b∴ )*)(/( qkr R ξ−= .   (4) 
Step 4. Check for the feasibility of *,MVSCb *1b= : 
• If RRR kbqSP ≤)|( *1*1, , then )( *1*, bq BBR = )( *1*1, bqR . Thus, setting *1bb =  would yield 
)( *1*, bq BBR = )(*1, bqR *q= . Set *,MVSCb *1b=  and stop. 
• If RRR kbqSP >)|( *1*1, , then )( *1*, bq BBR = )( *1*2, bqR . However, setting *1bb =  would not 
yield )( *1*, bq BBR *q=  since setting *1bb =  can only achieve )(*1, bqR *q= , but here 
)( *1*, bq BBR = )(*2, bqR . Go to Step 5. 
Step 5. Check for the feasibility of *,MVSCb *2b=  (after Step 4): 
• If RRR kbqSP >)|( *2*1, , then )( *2*, bq BBR = )( *2*2, bqR . Thus, setting *2bb =  would yield 
)(*, bq BBR = )(*2, bqR *,MVSCq= . Set *,MVSCb *2b=  and stop. 
• If RRR kbqSP ≤)|( *2*1, , then )( *2*, bq BBR = )( *2*1, bqR . In this case, setting *2bb =  can only 
achieve )(*2, bqR *q=  (but not )( *2*1, bqR *q=  which implies )( *2*, bq BBR *q= ). Thus, we 
are not able to achieve )( *2*, bq BBR *q= . In this situation, setting both *,MVSCb *1b=  and 
*,MVSCb *2b=  cannot achieve coordination in the MV domain. 
Procedure 1 gives us the detailed steps for identifying the buy-back price which can achieve 
coordination in a mean-variance domain. Since the buy-back price is bounded between  v 
and w, i.e. wbv <≤ , a checking on the computed value of *,MVSCb  with respect to this 
bound is a required feasibility test. 
6. Coordination by the wholesale pricing and profit sharing contract in the 
mean-variance domain 
With the wholesale pricing and profit sharing contract, we rewrite (P2) into )),(2( αwP  as 
follows, 
)),(2( αwP
   
,],;[..
],;[max
RR
R
q
kwqSPts
wqEP
≤α
α
 
where  ],;[ αwqEPR = ])()()[( 0 xdxFvrqwr
q∫−−−α , ],;[ αwqSPR = )()( qvr ξα −  (see Table 3),  
α  is the proportion of profit that the retailer takes and w is wholesale price offered by the 
manufacturer to the retailer. Represent the optimal quantity which maximizes )),(2( αwP  by 
),(*, αwq WPR . Similar to the idea in Section 4, we define the following: 
 ),(*2, αwqR = }0),|({arg =− RR
q
kwqSP α , (5) 
 )]/()[()( 1*1, vrwrFwqR −−= − . (6) 
www.intechopen.com
 Supply Chain: Theory and Applications 
 
92 
Notice that )(*1, wqR  is the order quantity which maximizes the retailer’s expected profit with 
a given w and it is independent of α . Suppose that α  is initially set to be oα (where 
10 << oα ) upon the negotiation between the retailer and the manufacturer. The following 
procedure gives the steps to identify the wholesale price and/or the necessary adjustment in  
α  in order to achieve coordination in the mean-variance domain: 
Procedure 2 
Step 1. Compute *q  by solving (P1). 
Step 2. Determine  a parameter *w  which makes )(*1, wqR  = *q  as follows: 
)(*1, wqR  = *q  
⇔ *1 )]/()[( qvrwrF =−−−  
 ∴ =*w *)()( qFvrr −− .  (7) 
Step 3. Determine a parameter *α  which makes ),(*2, αwqR *q= as follows: 
),(*2, αwqR *q=  
⇔ 0),|*( =− RR kwqSP α  
Rkqvr =−⇔ *)()( ξα  
 ∴ =*α
*)()( qvr
kR
ξ− .  (8) 
Step 4. Check for the feasibility of setting the wholesale price w = *w  with α  = oα . 
• If RoRR kwwqSP ≤= )|*)(( *1, α , then setting w = *w  with α  = oα  can already make 
),(*, αwq WPR *q= .  Thus, we can set  the wholesale price w = *w  with α  = oα , and 
stop; otherwise, go to Step 5. 
Step 5. Check for the feasibility of setting another value of α . 
• If RoRR kwwqSP >= )|*)(( *1, α , then: 
• Option 1: The manufacturer can try to negotiate with the retailer and set a value of 
α  = 1α  (where 10 1 << α ) with which  RRR kwwqSP ≤= )|*)(( 1*1, α . 
• Option 2: The manufacturer can check and see if 1* <α . If 1* <α , then the 
manufacturer can propose to the retailer by setting a value of α  = *α  (where 
1*0 <<α )  which can make ),(*, αwq WPR *q= .   
Procedure 2 provides to us some guidelines for determining the contract parameters of the 
wholesale pricing and profit sharing contract which can help to achieve coordination in the 
mean-variance domain.  
 
www.intechopen.com
Mean-Variance Analysis of Supply Chain Contracts 
 
93 
7.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have conducted a mean-variance analysis for supply chains under a buy-
back contract and a wholesale pricing and profit sharing contract. We characterize in the 
supply chain the return and the risk by the expected profit and the standard deviation of 
profit, respectively. We focus our discussions on the centralized supply chains. From the 
structural properties of the supply chain, we find that the buy-back price and the wholesale 
price are simply internal money transfers between the retailer and the manufacturer. A 
change of these prices will lead to a change of the profit and risk sharing between the 
retailer and the manufacturer. We illustrate how a buy-back contract and a wholesale 
pricing and profit sharing contract can coordinate a supply chain in a mean-variance 
domain. Efficient procedures are proposed. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
optimal contract parameters to be found in its feasible region can then be determined. 
Observe that channel coordination in the mean-variance domain is not always achievable. 
This finding is important because when we ignore the risk aversions of the individual 
supply chain members (as what most papers in the literature assume), channel coordination 
can always be achieved by setting a buy-back contract and a wholesale pricing and profit 
sharing contract. However, in the real-world, different supply chain members have different 
degrees of risk aversion, and hence a realistic contract should be set with respect to the risk 
aversions of these individual decision makers. Moreover, intuitively, when the risk 
aversions between the supply chain coordinator and the retailer are too far away, channel 
coordination may not be achievable and this point can be revealed by using our  analytical 
models. From the studies in this chapter, we can see that the mean-variance model can 
provide a systematic framework for studying channel coordination issues in stochastic 
supply chain models with risk and profit considerations. This framework can be further 
extended and used to study a large variety of supply chain contracts. 
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in-time delivery, precise inventory visibility, and up-to-the-minute distribution-tracking capabilities. Technology
advances have enabled supply chains to become strategic weapons that can help avoid disasters, lower costs,
and make money. From internal enterprise processes to external business transactions with suppliers,
transporters, channels and end-users marks the wide range of challenges researchers have to handle. The
aim of this book is at revealing and illustrating this diversity in terms of scientific and theoretical fundamentals,
prevailing concepts as well as current practical applications.
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